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ABSTRACT
The use of smartphones as navigation devices has become more prevalent. The ubiquity of
hand-held navigation devices such as Garmins or Toms Toms has been falling whereas the
ownership of smartphones and their adoption as GPS devices is growing. This work provides
a comprehensive study of the most popular smartphone mapping applications, namely Google
Maps, Apple Maps, Waze, MapQuest, Bing, and Scout, on both Android and iOS. It details
what data was found, where it was found, and how it was acquired for each application.
Based on the findings, the work allowed for the construction of a tool capable of parsing the
data from all of the aforementioned applications as well as creating maps of the locations
attained. It was discovered that much data relating to the user’s navigation history, be it
addresses, latitude longitude points, etc., were stored on the user’s device. It was also found
that in almost all cases, discerning whether the user had actually traveled to a destination
from the mapping application data was not possible.
Keywords: Mapping application forensics, iOS forensics, Android forensics, GPS forensics,
Waze forensics, Google Maps forensics, Apple Maps forensics, MapQuest forensics, Scout
forensics, Bing forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, global smartphone ownership
reached 1.859 billion people. This is ex-
pected to rise to over 2 billion by the end
of 2016, and by the end of 2018 smart-
phone penetration is projected to increase
to just over 36% of the global population
(2.48 billion users) (Statista, 2016). Smart-
phones have surpassed the ownership level
of personal computers and have become a
main element of crime scene investigations
(Umale, Deshmukh, & Tambhakhe, 2014).
McMillan, Glisson, and Bromby (2013) con-
ducted research in the United Kingdom
which illustrated the rise of criminal activi-
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ties involving smartphones at an average rate
of growth of ten cases per year from 2006 to
2011.
A segment of applications that has gone
largely unnoticed by the research commu-
nity is that of mapping applications. Paral-
leled with the increase in smartphone adop-
tion as navigation devices has been the de-
crease in the use of hand-held navigation de-
vices like Garmins (Statista, 2012). In the
United States alone, Google Maps and Ap-
ple Maps, have 64.5 and 42 million users,
respectively (Buczkowski, 2014), while the
remaining applications seen in Table 1 ac-
count for around a total of 50 million users
(Cohan, 2013). Worldwide, both Google
Maps (46.7%) and Apple Maps (26.2%) have
significant penetration in the mobile domain
(Statista, 2015).
The nature of mapping applications, navi-
gating a user to a destination, directing users
around traffic, etc., makes them likely to
hold data on where the user has been, what
time they were there, their traveling tenden-
cies, etc., some even offer chatting services
with other users (see Table 2). It is apparent
why data such as this may be of importance
to investigators and as such is the reason for
the examination of the highly adopted map-
ping applications listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Tested applications
Application Android Vers. iOS Vers.
Google
Maps
9.6.1 4.8.62649
Apple Maps NA 8.3
Waze 3.9.3.0 3.2.9.1
MapQuest 2.7.7 4.8
Bing Maps 5.2.0.20140710 5.4
Scout GPS 2.5.1.0021 2.1.1
At the time of writing this paper, litera-
ture on the forensics of smartphone mapping
applications was sparse. Our work aimed at
filling the gap in the scientific literature.
Our research informs practitioners, re-
searchers and the digital forensics commu-
nity at large on methods of extracting data
from the applications in Table 2. It identi-
fied the digital forensic artifacts that can be
found by analyzing each of these applications
and resulted in a tool that can be used to
analyze potential digital evidence from the
applications.
Manual retrieval of data from these appli-
cations would take a considerable amount of
time and expertise. Not all of the files asso-
ciated with these applications can be opened
and read by human eyes. Some files need to
be decoded, some have no structure making
them difficult to follow, and certain files con-
tain data of interest which is hidden amongst
an immense amount of irrelevant data.
Smart NAVigation Parser (SNAVP), the
tool constructed during this research (see
Sec. 5), combats all of these issues by i) out-
putting an organized, searchable, sortable,
and easy to read Excel file where all of
the data related to these applications can
be found ii) eliminating the need to have
a person with the expertise needed to de-
code/translate certain files to a human read-
able format, and iii) removing the need for
an investigator to manually search through a
device’s forensic image to locate and extract
evidence. The tool also contributes a frame-
work to the digital forensics community that
can easily be built upon to include new ver-
sions of the tested applications as well as any
new mapping applications released in the fu-
ture.
In the remainder of the paper we first dis-
cuss related work in Sec. 2. We then describe
our methodology in Sec. 3. We later share
our findings of the artifacts found from the
various mapping applications in Sec. 4. The
constructed extensible SNAVP tool is then
described in Sec. 5. We lastly present future
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Table 2. Application features
Application Navigation Directions Chatting ETA Home/Work Address Favorites Location Sharing
Google Maps X X - - X X -
Apple Maps X X - - - X -
Waze X X X X X - X
MapQuest X X - - X - -
Bing Maps - X - - - - -
Scout GPS X X X X X X -
work and limitations in Sec. 6 and conclu-
sions in Sec. 7.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Hand-held satellite
navigation devices
Research has been conducted in the area
of hand-held satellite navigation devices
such as Garmins, TomToms, and Magellans
(Van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010; Arbelet, 2014).
Past work illustrated the importance of the
digital evidence that could be extracted from
these devices such as where the user has
been, how they got there, who owns them,
favorite addresses, etc. (Last, 2009). Evi-
dence such as this may lead to a number of
important discoveries during investigations
including behavioral profiles of those who
have used the device (Colombini, Colella,
Castiglione, & Scognamiglio, 2012).
Notwithstanding, satellite navigation de-
vices are being replaced by smartphone map-
ping applications. Garmin reported a com-
pany worth less than a third of its value in
2007 as well a 15 percent reduction in sales
in 2013 (Leber, 2013). Much of this drop
was accredited to the increasing ubiquity of
smartphones and the usage of the mapping
applications on them replacing Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) devices.
2.2 Mobile phone forensics
McMillan et al. (2013) conducted a survey
which found that calls and Short Message
Service (SMS) data held the most evidential
importance during investigations; however,
user and application data were also found to
be of high importance. Much of the work
in the mobile forensics domain has focused
on discovering these types of data on vari-
ous Operating Systems (Hoog, 2011; Casey,
Bann, & Doyle, 2010; Sima˜o, S´ıcoli, Melo,
Deus, & Sousa Ju´nior, 2011).
For instance, Al Mutawa, Baggili, and
Marrington (2012) investigated the foren-
sic artifacts that could be extracted from
different social media applications such as
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. Fur-
thermore, researchers such as Mahajan,
Dahiya, and Sanghvi (2013) and Thing,
Ng, and Chang (2010) examined what dig-
ital forensic artifacts could be recovered
from different messaging services and ap-
plications such as WhatsApp and Viber.
Newer studies focused on examining the net-
work forensic implications of similar social-
messaging applications (Karpisek, Baggili, &
Breitinger, 2015; Walnycky, Baggili, Mar-
rington, Moore, & Breitinger, 2015).
Maus, Ho¨fken, and Schuba (2011) con-
ducted a study concerning geodata on An-
droid phones where they used geodata from
all applications on a device which stored lo-
cation data in an attempt to provide the in-
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vestigator with a viewable map of where the
user had been.
However, retrieving data from mobile de-
vices has comes with several challenges
for researchers and investigators (Bennett,
2012). The nature of smartphones, the
Central Processing Unit (CPU) architecture,
their processing and memory resources, as
well as the sheer number of used Operat-
ing Systems (OS), severely complicates the
forensic acquisition and analysis of these
devices (Barmpatsalou, Damopoulos, Kam-
bourakis, & Katos, 2013).
The process gets more complex when one
takes into account the high rate of change
in the mobile field (new applications, appli-
cation versions, OS versions, etc.), the num-
ber of different devices that are in use, and
the lack of software, hardware, and interface
standardization (Lessard & Kessler, 2010;
Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007). Casey
and Stellatos (2008) also noted that encryp-
tion of the data on these devices is be-
coming more prevalent having notable im-
plications on digital forensic investigations.
These challenges present investigators and
researchers with a difficult task whenever a
mobile device is being examined.
2.2.1 Android forensics
The challenges posed by Android devices
stem from the wide array of versions the
platform supports. Many developers and
companies put their own twist on the plat-
form when releasing their devices leading to
every device/Android version combination
to possess unique characteristics. A minor
difference in the Android version may require
extensive testing and validation of tools be-
fore they can be deemed forensically sound
on a given system (Hoog, 2011).
Android forensics is an active area of re-
search. For example, Vidas, Zhang, and
Christin (2011) focused on developing a
general collection methodology for the vast
amount of Android devices. Distefano, Me,
and Pace (2010), however, focused on dis-
covering different anti-forensic methods used
on Android devices. Albano, Castiglione,
Cattaneo, and De Santis (2011) developed a
technique that provided the ability to mod-
ify and erase, securely and selectively, digi-
tal evidence on an Android device using sim-
ple software tools that are commonly seen on
*nix-like operating systems such as Android.
The analysis of phone memory has also
been of importance to Android forensics as
valuable data such as passwords, text mes-
sages, etc. may be contained within the
memory (Thing et al., 2010). Many tools
have been created to aid in this process.
Several plugins for Volatility – an ad-
vanced memory forensics framework – were
created to read data such as passwords, chat
messages, user names, and e-mail (Macht,
2013). Sylve, Case, Marziale, and Richard
(2012) designed a kernel module for dump-
ing memory that addressed the difficulties
in developing device-independent acquisition
tools while Leppert (2012) focused on acquir-
ing and analyzing heap-dumps of Android
applications.
2.2.2 iOS forensics
Breaking the security barriers of the newer
versions of iOS devices so that physical im-
ages may be acquired without jailbreaking
the device has become increasingly difficult
(Belenko & Sklyarov, 2011). Jailbreaking in-
volves removing restrictions on the device
so that a physical image may be acquired,
however, this process alters data on the de-
vice itself possibly tainting its forensic value.
One would have to know that none of the
user data was altered and that the exact al-
teration of any other data on the device be
known for an acquisition method to be con-
sidered forensically sound.
The difficulty of acquiring a physical im-
age of an iOS device has made other extrac-
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tion methods more prominent when dealing
with newer iOS devices. A common ap-
proach leverages the iPhone backup files cre-
ated with the iTunes backup utility (Bader &
Baggili, 2010; Morrissey & Campbell, 2010).
This method only acquires data that has
been synchronized by the backup protocol,
but as stated by Hoog and Strzempka (2011)
most of the allocated data can be retrieved
using this method. This method was deter-
mined to be the premier method for logi-
cal acquisition for iOS devices (Tso, Wang,
Huang, & Wang, 2012). Another often used
approach is logical extraction. This proce-
dure extracts active folders and files directly
from the iPhone, but does not retrieve any
data from the unallocated space.
3. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research fol-
lowed the guidelines for forensically exam-
ining artifacts presented by NIST (Kent,
Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006). The
smartphones that were used in our examina-
tion were a Samsung S4 Active (SGH-i537)
running Android version 4.4.2 and an iPhone
4s Model A1387 running iOS 8.2. Towards
the end of the research, the Samsung S4 Ac-
tive stopped turning on and could no longer
be used, therefore, a Samsung Galaxy S4
Zoom (SM-C101) running Android version
4.4.2 was used when investigating Google
Maps and Bing.
Our research methodology was broken into
three phases data creation and acquisition
(Sec. 3.1), data analysis (Sec. 3.2), and tool
creation (Sec. 3.3). The high level method-
ology is portrayed in Fig. 1.
3.1 Phase I: data creation and
acquisition
Several actions were performed on each ap-
plication. These actions were chosen based
on the features of each application shown
Figure 1. High level methodology for An-
droid and iOS
in Table 2. Each action was recorded and
logged so that any data on the mobile de-
vice resulting from the given action could be
discerned.
The devices were acquired using .XRY 1.
.XRY is software which forensically extracts
data from a variety of mobile devices. A
device image was acquired after each entry
shown in Table 3. The Samsung S4 Ac-
tive and the Samsung Galaxy S4 Zoom were
physically acquired, while all of the images
of the iPhone 4S were logical due to physical
acquisition of the iPhone 4s not being sup-
ported by any tools at the time of conducting
the acquisition.
We note that although we used differ-
ent acquisition methods on the devices, our
work’s scope focused on the allocated space,
making the method of extraction not as sig-
1Micro Systemation AB (MSAB), https://www
.msab.com/, last accessed 2015-09-29
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Table 3. Actions performed
# Recorded action
1 A fresh install of the application
2 A location was inserted into the ap-
plication and traveled to
3 A location was inserted into the ap-
plication and not traveled to
4 Application specific features such as
sending messages, sharing locations,
etc.
nificant as it would be had any of the data
discovered was found in unallocated space.
3.2 Phase II: data analysis
Analysis of the acquired forensic images was
completed using a variety of tools. .XRY and
Cellebrite were used to mount and explore
the acquired images to discover files related
to the tested applications.
Once files were identified, several tools
were utilized to inspect the file contents.
WinHex 2, a universal hexidecimal editor,
was used to identify file headers and inspect
the content of files that were not recognized
by .XRY.
DB Browser for SQLite3 is a visual open
source tool that allows for the creation, de-
sign, editing, and viewing of database files
that are compatible with SQLite. This tool
was used to explore the contents of any
SQlite database encountered.
XML files were inspected with Sublime
Text, a text editor for code, markup, and
prose 4, while any binary plist files encoun-
tered were inspected using a combination of
2http://www.x-ways.net/winhex/, last ac-
cessed 2015-11-23
3http://sqlitebrowser.org/, last accessed
2015-12-09
4http://www.sublimetext.com/, last accessed
2015-12-07
Xcode 7, a powerful IDE 5, and the Termi-
nal.
3.3 Phase III: Smart
Navigation Parser
(SNAVP)
SNAVP, the tool created during this research
was designed to parse out as much of the
data as possible that was found based on
our findings. It was designed as a command
line tool with modularity and extensiblity
in mind so that additional parsers may be
added it to it at any time. SNAVP is dis-
cussed in further detail in Sec. 5.
4. RESULTS
This section describes the results of the arti-
facts found in detail. For a summary of the
artifacts found, refer to Table 5 and Table 6.
4.1 Google Maps - Android
Google Maps contained four
files of evidentiary value:
da destination history, search history.db,
com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml,
and DATA SYNC DATA.
da destination history was an SQLite
database file that contained location data
related to the starting and ending locations
that the user selected to retrieve directions
to. In order for data to be present in this
database, the user had to have selected ’nav-
igate’ after entering in locations.
search history.db, another SQLite
database, held the user’s search data.
This meant that navigation was not nec-
essary for data to appear in this database,
the data was entered as soon as the user
searched for any location within Google
Maps.
5https://developer.apple.com/xcode/, last
accessed 2015-11-20
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com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml
was an XML file that contained the user’s
preferences and more specifically the last
user account name to use Google Maps.
DATA SYNC DATA contained cloud data
based on the user account that was using the
application. So, for example, if a user had
saved a search using a different device, that
location would be found in this file so that
it could be used on any device as long as the
user was signed into Google Maps.
4.2 Google Maps - iOS
No data that related to the user’s searches,
navigation, or saved locations were
found on the iPhone; however, the file
com.google.Maps.plist did include the
user’s last known location along with what
seemed to be other files of interest. In
com.google.Maps.plist was a reference to a
plist file called 1436530344726.plist. The
name of the plist file, 1436530344726, was
in the form of a Unix timestamp that
converted to July 10, 8:12 AM EST, the
time at which the last search occurred while
using Google Maps.
4.3 Apple Maps
Only one file, GeoHistory.mapsdata, was
found to contain data related to the
user’s actions in Apple Maps. GeoHis-
tory.mapsdata was a plist file that held data
pertaining to what the user had searched for
within the application as well as Yelp reviews
for the given locations if applicable.
4.4 Waze - Android
The files waze log.txt, user.db, tiles nt.db,
and tts.db were found to hold data related
to the user’s activity while using the Waze
application.
waze log.txt contained an immense
amount of data. The file was separated into
active sessions which were defined as the
time from when the user had opened the
Waze application to when they closed out
of it. Three different actions were found to
cause a RoutingRequest within this file i)
when a route was requested by the user ii)
when GPS signal was lost and then found
again during navigation, and iii) when
rerouting occurred during navigation. A
RoutingRequest contained a starting and
ending location in the form of latitude
and longitude points for the requested
route, and the two lines directly above each
RoutingRequest contained a timestamp and
current location of the user.
user.db was a SQLite database that con-
tained a plethora of data including the des-
tination the user had received directions to,
the time at which the directions were re-
quested, and the Estimated Time of Arrivals
(ETAs) that were sent or received. It is
critical to note that the data mentioned ap-
peared in the database at the time naviga-
tion was selected within Waze; meaning that
there was no way to discern whether the user
had actually traveled to the destination form
the data found in this database.
tiles nt.db was a SQLite database that
contained data which related to images of
the pieces of maps that were needed for nav-
igation sessions. An approach to relate the
entries in this database to the many loca-
tions that were navigated to was not discov-
ered and warrants future research.
tts.db was another SQLite database. It
held paths to the audio direction files that
were used during navigation, i.e. turn right,
continue straight, etc; however, a way to link
the entries in this table to specific navigation
sessions was not found.
Waze uniquely had the feature of sending
and receiving messages to other users. The
messages that were sent and received were
not found on the device; however, prior re-
search by Storozuk (2014) found that the
messages could be found in the device’s
memory.
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4.5 Waze - iOS
The only file found on the logical image
of the iPhone was user.db. This SQLite
database had the exact same structure
and data as its Android counterpart (see
Sec. 4.4).
4.6 MapQuest - Android
A SQLite database named search.db con-
tained all of the data pertaining to the
places that the user navigated to while using
MapQuest. Three fields within the search
table were found to hold the most impor-
tance in this research.
Two fields contained UNIX timestamps.
The ctime field referred to when the user had
searched for directions, while the atime field
referred to the time that MapQuest actually
retrieved the directions that were queried.
The third field was titled json and was a
json field that contained the address and lon-
gitude and latitude coordinates of the desti-
nation along with a userInput key that held
the text that the user had actually searched
for.
4.7 MapQuest - iOS
The data that related to the user’s navi-
gation history while using MapQuest was
found in the file com.aol.mapquest.plist.
This plist file contained data such as latitude
and longitude coordinates and addresses of
destinations searched for or marked as a fa-
vorite by the user; however, there were no
timestamps associated with these entries and
the data structure was the same whether the
destination was actually traveled to or not.
4.8 Bing Maps
Bing Maps was unique in that it was not a
stand alone mapping application; the Bing
Maps segment was just a part of the over-
all Bing application. As the purpose of this
research was to test mapping applications,
only the Bing Maps portion of the applica-
tion was tested. Further, Bing had the op-
tion to search privately, and if the user was
in private mode, Bing claimed that the users
search history would not be stored by the ap-
plication.
4.8.1 Bing Maps - Android
A single SQLite database file, SearchHisto-
ryDatabase.db, held the user’s search history
when private browsing was not enabled. It
had a simple structure of three tables with
the table of interest being SearchHistory.
The NAME field in this table referred to
the text that was searched for and the LAST
field correlated with the time that the search
occurred.
4.8.2 Bing Maps - iOS
The iOS version of Bing was found to hold
several files that contained data regarding
the actions performed by the user, a His-
tory.plist file along with multiple *.dat files.
History.plist contained the search history
of the user as long as private searching was
not enabled. Any search that occurred while
private searching was enabled did not re-
sult in an entry in Historys.plist. For an
entry to be made here, the location had to
be searched for using the search bar of the
Bing Maps application. If the “get direc-
tions” icon was pressed prior to searching for
a location then that location would not ap-
pear in Historys.plist.
The *.dat files, where the * represents an
integer value, were found at two locations.
The non-private version of the *.dat file was
stored in the Documents/Journal directory.
This directory did not exist until a search
had occurred within the application, while
the private version of these files were stored
in the Documents/PriJournal directory, and
similar to the non-private version, the Pri-
Journal directory did not exist until a search
had occurred when privacy was enabled.
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It was found that the highest numbered
*.dat file contained data on the most recent
location that was searched by the user, with
or without private browsing enabled.
4.9 Scout - Android
Two files were found which contained data
deemed of evidentiary value, a SQLite
database named scoutAppDatabase.db and
an XML file titled Route *.
scoutAppDatabase.db contained eight ta-
bles that held data pertaining to the user’s
actions while using Scout. This included
members of chat sessions, the messages
themselves, configuration data, the address
along with the longitude and latitude coor-
dinates of locations that were navigated to,
and usernames of friends of the user.
A different Route * file was created each
time a location was navigated to where the
* was replaced by the UNIX timestamp of
when the navigation session was first cre-
ated. Within the file was detailed infor-
mation about every route that was offered
to the user for a given destination and also
specified the exact route that the user had
chosen. Each route was broken up into seg-
ments, thereby allowing one to reconstruct
each given route by combining their respec-
tive segments.
Unfortunately, in both files, the location
data was created at the time that navigation
was requested, making it difficult to discern
whether the user had actually traveled to the
destination.
4.10 Scout - iOS
Only one plist file, namely
com.telenav.scout.push store.log was found
to hold data related to user’s navigation,
however, the data within this file was
incomplete. For example, the file held the
UNIX timestamp of when the navigation
was started and only the final direction of
the navigation session, i.e. in one of the
test scenarios, the only direction found was
“Turn left to Ruden St” (the final direction
before the user would reach their actual
destination). Because of this, the sequence
of actions performed on the iOS device were
completed several times as to ensure that
the lack of data was not caused by an error,
but still, only incomplete data was found in
com.telenav.scout.pushstore.log.
Our findings helped us construct the basis
for a parser for all of these applications which
we discuss in the Sec. 5 that follows.
5. SMART
NAVIGATION PARSER
(SNAVP)
In its initial release, SNAVP was designed as
a command line tool that took one required
parameter and one optional parameter. The
required parameter was signified by a -i and
took the location of the input, i.e. a file, a
directory, a device image, a zip file etc., as
an argument. The optional parameter was
signified by a -o and was the location where
the program would write its output to. If
no argument was provided for the output lo-
cation, the output defaulted to the current
working directory.
After the input was received, the program
proceeded to determine the nature of the in-
put, i.e. whether it is a tar file, an image
file, a single file, or a directory. The type of
input determined the next steps, a tar file
would have to be unpacked, an image would
have have to be mounted, etc.; however, we
note that not all image files were mountable
(see Sec. 6). Each file in the input was then
iterated over and had its file header or ex-
tension checked to determine if it was a file
of interest.
A file of interest was defined as a binary
plist (bplist), a sqlite database, a text file, or
an XML file. These were all of the file types
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from the tested applications that were found
to hold digital evidence of forensic value. If
a file was of interest, the parsers would run
their validity check against the file, and if
passed, the parser would then parse the file
and send the parsed data back to the main
program where it would be written out to an
Excel file.
The first sheet of every Excel file, titled
Parsers Ran (see Figure 2), lists the parsers
that were run on the input given, provide
the file path to the file that they were run on
and the color of the marks for each respec-
tive application that can be seen on the All
Applications Map (Figure 3). The data re-
trieved from each individual parser was con-
tained on its own respective sheet within the
created Excel document.
5.1 Program structure
The first file shown in Figure 4 is ParseCon-
trol.py. This file controlled the overall pro-
gram. It received the user’s input, ran the
necessary parsers, collected the data, created
the map files, and wrote it all out to an Excel
file.
The Dependencies folder contained three
key elements of SNAVP. FileCheck.py deter-
mined whether or not a given file was of the
type txt, sqlite, plist, or xml. This was de-
termined by using the file header and/or the
file extension. The action of Mount.py is de-
termined by the input that was given. If the
input was an image file, Mount.py would at-
tempt to mount the file so that its contents
could be read. If the input was a tar or
zip file, it would extract the data to a given
folder so that it may be read, etc. Work-
sheetData.py contained the WorksheetData
class. This class was used to store the data
from the individual parsers in a manner that
ParseControl.py could interpret.
The Parsers folder contained all of the in-
dividual parsers that could be executed. As
mentioned in Sec. 3.3, SNAVP was designed
in a modular manner. To add a new parser
to the tool, one would only have to add the
parser file to this folder, and add the file
name to the init.py file. As long as the parser
created followed the WorksheetData class, it
would be correctly integrated into SNAVP.
5.2 Dependencies
• The Sleuth Kit - is a C library along
with a collection of command line tools
that allow the analysis of disk images.
Many tools, such as Autopsy, use The
Sleuth Kit behind the scenes 6. SNAVP
used The Sleuth Kit to mount image
files and extract files of interest so that
they may be parsed.
• pytsk3 - is a Python package that is a
Python binding for The Sleuth Kit 7.
This allowed SNAVP to programmati-
cally mount images so that they could
be searched to determine if any files of
interest resided on the image. Those
files were then extracted and parsed if
applicable.
• pygmaps - is another Python package
that is a Python wrapper for Google
Maps 8. This provided SNAVP with the
capability to generate HTML files that
plot given coordinates on Google Maps.
• ccl-bplist - is a Python module that
helps deal with binary plist files
(bplists) 9. SNAVP utilized this module
when attempting to parse any bplists
that it encountered.
6The Sleuth Kit (TSK), http://www.sleuthkit
.org/, last accessed 2015-09-29
7pytsk3, https://github.com/py4n6/pytsk,
last accessed 2015-09-29
8pygmaps, https://code.google.com/p/
pygmaps/, last accessed 2015-09-29
9ccl-bplist, https://code.google.com/p/
ccl-bplist/, last accessed 2015-09-29
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Figure 2. First sheet of SNAVP output
Figure 3. All applications map
• XlsxWriter - is a Python module that al-
lowed the creation of Excel XLSX files
10. This module was used to organize
and produce the parsed data into an Ex-
cel workbook in a meaningful manner.
6. LIMITATIONS &
FUTURE WORK
The rate at which new versions of applica-
tions are released is overwhelming. SNAVP
was tested on the specific application ver-
sions shown in Table 1. This does not mean
it will not work on other versions, however,
it is possible that new and old versions of
these applications have different file names,
schemas for their files, etc. To combat this
challenge SNAVP was created in a modular
10XlsxWriter, http://xlsxwriter.readthedocs
.org/, last accessed 2015-09-29
Figure 4. SNAVP structure
manner so that new parsers may be added
to support any new or old versions of the
tested applications as well as any additional
GPS applications.
It is also important to note that the data
that all of these applications were tested
with was minimal in comparison to real data.
The tool may error out on larger sets of data
as not all possibilities could be accounted for
with such small sets of test data.
When a device image file was used as in-
put, not all of the images were mountable.
For example, .XRY used a proprietary file
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type .xry that caused the program to error
out when attempting to mount the image.
Therefore, any image file that could not be
mounted resulted in the user having to man-
ually locate and extract the files of inter-
est, then use the directory that the files were
placed in as the input to the tool.
All of the latitude longitude points
mapped by SNAVP were only accurate
within the United States. Many of the ap-
plications did not put the decimal point in
the latitude or longitude coordinate when it
was saved; SNAVP had to perform this ac-
tion. The decimal points vary in location de-
pending on the actual latitude or longitude;
therefore, the tool only guaranteed accuracy
when it placed the decimal point for loca-
tions that were in the United States.
7. CONCLUSION
An immense amount of potential digital ev-
idence related to the examined applications
were discovered during this research (sum-
marized in Table 5 and Table 6). This data
could hold great evidentiary value during dif-
ferent types of investigations. The times-
tamps combined with the current locations
in Waze can place users in certain vicini-
ties at certain times thereby corroborating
a story or an alibi. Knowing the route that
a user had taken (data from the Scout ap-
plication) can be used to locate evidence the
suspect may have dropped along a route or
locate cameras that may be used to track a
suspect.
Table 4 rates the tested applications, 1 be-
ing highest and 10 being lowest, on the de-
termined forensic value that they hold. The
rankings are relative to each other and are
a reflection on the amount and the type of
data that was ascertained from each appli-
cation during this research. It is important
to note that none of the data mentioned in
this work was found in unallocated space on
the devices.
Table 4. Determined forensic value ranking
of applications
Forensic value Application
1 Waze (Android)
2 Scout (Android)
3 Google Maps (Android)
4 Waze (iOS)
5 MapQuest (Android)
6 Bing (iOS)
7 MapQuest (iOS)
8 Apple Maps
9 Google Maps (iOS)
10 Scout (iOS)
The Android version of Waze topped the
list. In addition to the starting and ending
navigational points, it was found to period-
ically store the current location of the user.
Scout for Android was next, it was found to
store all of the routes given to the user for a
navigation session along with the route that
was chosen by the user. It also contained
messages that were sent between users on
the application. Google Maps was ranked
third because it stored the starting and end-
ing location of provided routes. Only the top
rated applications provided a starting loca-
tion.
Applications ranked 4 through 6 were all
similar as they provided data about the lo-
cations that were searched for or navigated
to. Notwithstanding, they did not provide
starting locations. MapQuest for iOS and
Apple Maps were ranked 7th and 8th re-
spectively. They both provided data on the
user’s search and navigation history but they
did not store any timestamps with the data
making it difficult to determine a timeline
for the user. Google Maps for iOS ranked
slightly ahead of Scout due to being able to
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determine the user’s last location right be-
fore exiting Google Maps. The iOS version
of Scout came in last as almost no data that
related to the locations searched for or navi-
gated to were found on the device. Note that
the Android version of Bing is not listed in
Table 4 since it could not be fully examined
during this research.
The downfall to the data that was found
on the devices was that actual travel was
never required for data to be saved. Most
of the tested applications stored their data
when it was either searched for or navigated
to. This could hurt cases as the user can-
not be placed at a particular point or on
a particular route without some other form
of corroborating evidence. Again, the An-
droid version of Waze was the only applica-
tion that was found to store the user’s cur-
rent location at different times; this data was
found in Waze’s log file. To combat this chal-
lenge, future work could attempt to correlate
GPS locations from multiple devices, as well
as GPS log data from the OS with the ones
found from the studied applications.
As mentioned in Sec. 2, valuable data was
found on handheld navigation devices such
as TomToms and Magellans. In fact, the
data found was very similar to that which
was found in this study. As with the data
found on the smartphones, data such as lo-
cations entered to, home, work, and favorite
addresses could be found on handheld nav-
igation devices; however, there was one im-
mense benefit gained from the data found
on handheld navigation devices as opposed
to the data found on smartphones. With
handheld navigation devices one was able to
differentiate whether a location in the GPS
was actually traveled to (Nutter, 2008).
Although being able to differentiate be-
tween these two circumstances may be of
importance, the rest of the mapping data
found on the smartphones was decidedly
similar to that found on handheld naviga-
tion devices. Thus, as it has been discussed
by Strawn (2009) that GPS devices have
helped prosecutors win cases, one may argue
that the mapping data found on the smart-
phones during this research would still be
of paramount importance during investiga-
tions.
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Table 5. Android - summary of results
Application File Description
Google Maps da destination history SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations that
occurred within Google Maps
Google Maps search history.db SQLite database that contained
data related to searches that oc-
curred within Google Maps
Google Maps DATA SYNC DATA Contained data from the user’s
account that did not take place
on the given device or took place
prior to Google Maps being unin-
stalled
Waze waze log.txt Text file that contained location
data related to routes selected by
the user and their current loca-
tions
Waze user.db SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations se-
lected by the user
MapQuest search.db SQLite database that contained
data related to the navigation his-
tory of the user
Bing SearchHistoryDatabase.dbSQLite database that contained
user search history when private
browsing was disabled
Scout scoutAppDatabase.db SQLite database that contained
navigation and messaging data
related to the user
Scout Route * XML file that contained the dif-
ferent routes for navigation ses-
sions, the * represented the unix
timestamp of the start of the re-
spective navigation session
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Table 6. iOS - summary of results
Application File Description
Apple Maps GeoHistory.mapsdata Plist file that contained data re-
lated to the user’s search history
Waze user.db SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations se-
lected by the user
MapQuest com.aol.mapquest.plist Plist file that contained naviga-
tion data relating to the user
Bing Historys.plist Plist file that contained data that
pertained to user searches
Bing *.dat (Non-private brows-
ing)
Plist file that contained data on
the most recent search, the * rep-
resented an integer value
Bing *.dat (Private browsing) Plist file that contained data on
the most recent private search,
the * represented an integer value
Scout com.telenav.scout.pushstore.logPlist file that contained incom-
plete navigational data
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